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T
he Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA) has suffered 
from many of the same unre-
alistic underwriting assumptions 
that have done in so many lenders 
during the 2000s. It too was harmed 
by a housing market as bad as any 
seen since the Great Depression. 
As a result, the federal government 
announced in 2013 that the FHA 
would require the irst bailout in its 
history. Margaret Chadbourn, U.S. 
Federal Housing Administration to Tap 
$1.7 Bln in Taxpayer Funds, Reuters, 
Sept. 27, 2013, http://reuters.com/
article/usa-housingbailout-idUS-
W1N0G702P20130927. At the same 
time that it faced these inancial chal-
lenges, the FHA came under attack 
for poor execution of some of its 
policies attempting to expand home-
ownership opportunities. 
Leading commentators have 
called for the federal government to 
stop employing the FHA to do any-
thing other than provide liquidity 
to the low end of the mortgage mar-
ket. These critics’ arguments rely on 
a couple of examples of programs 
that were clear failures, but they fail 
to address the FHA’s long history 
of undertaking comparable initia-
tives. In fact, the FHA has a history of 
successfully conducting new home-
ownership programs. The FHA does 
have operational laws, however, that 
should be addressed to prevent them 
from reoccurring if the FHA were to 
undertake similar homeownership 
initiatives in the future.
This article examines the criticism 
that has been leveled at FHA and the 
goals the agency should pursue. For 
a more thorough treat-
ment of this topic by the author, see 
the author’s law review article on the 
subject. David Reiss, Underwriting 
Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal 
Housing Administration and the Low 
Down Payment Loan, 50 Ga. L. Rev. 
1019 (2016).
Introduction to the FHA
Mortgage insurance is a product that 
is paid for by the homeowner but 
protects the lender if the homeowner 
defaults on the mortgage. The insurer 
pays the lender for the losses that it 
suffers from any default by the home-
owner. Mortgage insurance typically 
is required for borrowers with lim-
ited funds for down payments. Gen. 
Accounting Ofice, GAO/RCED-
96-123, Homeownership:  FHA’s Role 
in Helping People Obtain Home Mort-
gages 16 (1996), http://www.gao.
gov/archive/1996/rc96123.pdf. The 
FHA provides mortgage insurance 
for mortgage loans on single fam-
ily and multifamily homes and is the 
world’s largest government mortgage 
insurer. Other signiicant provid-
ers are the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) and private companies, 
known as private mortgage insurers 
(PMIs). Mortgage insurance makes 
homeownership possible for many 
households that would otherwise 
not be able to meet the underwriting 
requirements of lenders.
As with much of the federal hous-
ing infrastructure, the FHA has 
its roots in the Great Depression. 
National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 
73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). The pri-
vate mortgage insurance industry, 
like many others, was devastated in 
the early 1930s. Its companies began 
to fail as almost half of all mortgages 
in the nation 
defaulted. The FHA was 
created to replace the PMI indus-
try, which remained dormant for 
decades.
Housing markets faced problems 
in the Great Depression that were 
similar in kind to those encountered 
in the late 2000s. These problems 
included rapidly falling housing 
prices, widespread unemployment 
and underemployment, rapid tight-
ening of credit, and, as a result of 
these trends, much higher rates of 
default and foreclosure. The FHA 
noted in its second annual report that 
the “shortcomings of the old system 
need no recital. It inanced extensive 
overselling of houses at inlated val-
ues, to borrowers unable to pay for 
them . . . .” U.S. Fed. Hous. Admin., 
Second Ann. Rep. Fed. Housing Admin. 
28 (1936). Needless to say, the same 
could be said of our most recent 
housing bust.
Over its lifetime, the FHA has 
insured more than 40 million 
mortgages, helping to make home-
ownership available to a broad swath 
of American households. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., Annual Report to 
Congress Regarding the Financial Status 
of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insur-
ance Fund Fiscal Year 2014 (2014), at 
60. And indeed, the FHA mortgage 
has been essential to America’s trans-
formation from a nation of renters to 
a nation of homeowners. Kenneth T. 
Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Sub-
urbanization of the United States 205 
(1985). The early FHA created the 
modern American housing inance 
system, as well as the look and feel 
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because of the construction stan-
dards it set for the new houses that it 
insured. Id. at 205, 215.
The FHA also had many other mis-
sions over the course of its existence 
and a mixed legacy to match. The 
FHA’s role changed, beginning in the 
1950s, from serving the entire mort-
gage market to focusing on speciic 
segments of it. This changed mission 
had a major effect on everything the 
FHA did, including how it under-
wrote mortgage insurance and for 
whom it did so.
The Failures of the FHA
The FHA is an understudied topic, 
despite having a massive effect on 
the built environment of the United 
States. The neglect is particularly 
unfortunate because the FHA has had 
some severe failures that mar its long 
history of success as a provider of 
liquidity for, stability in, and access 
to the residential mortgage market. 
Because of these shortcomings, the 
leading commentators on the FHA 
have judged its initiatives to encour-
age homeownership to be failures. 
The absence of a vibrant and bal-
anced scholarly exchange regarding 
the FHA stands in the way of respon-
sibly charting its future course.
In recent years, the FHA has come 
under attack for its poor execution of 
some of its attempts to expand home-
ownership opportunities, and leading 
commentators have called for the fed-
eral government to stop assigning 
such mandates to the FHA. See, e.g., 
Joseph Gyourko, Rethinking the FHA 
1 (Am. Enter. Inst. 2013). They argue 
that the FHA should focus on pro-
viding liquidity for the portion of the 
mortgage market that serves low- and 
moderate-income households. Edward 
J. Pinto, How the FHA Hurts Work-
ing-Class Families and Communities 41 
(Am. Enter. Inst. 2012). These critics 
rely heavily on a couple of examples 
of failed programs, such as the Sec-
tion 235 program enacted as part of 
the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968 and the American Dream 
Downpayment Assistance Act of 2003. 
These programs required tiny or 
even nominal down payments. The 
Section 235 program was enacted 
in response to the riots that burned 
through American cities in the 
1960s. It was intended to expand 
homeownership opportunities for 
low-income households, particularly 
African-American ones. The Ameri-
can Dream program also was geared 
to increase homeownership among 
lower-income and minority house-
holds. The crux of the critique of 
these programs is that they failed to 
ensure that borrowers had the capac-
ity to repay their mortgages, leading 
to bad results for the FHA and bor-
rowers alike.
Notwithstanding these harmful 
initiatives, the FHA has a parallel his-
tory of successfully undertaking new 
homeownership programs. These 
successes include programs for veter-
ans returning home from World War 
II, a mission that was later handed 
off to the VA. At the same time, the 
FHA has clearly suffered from opera-
tional failures over the course of its 
existence that should be addressed in 
the design of any future initiatives. 
Unfortunately, the FHA has not really 
grappled with its past failures as it 
moves beyond the inancial crisis.
Robert Van Order and Anthony 
Yezer, the authors of the FHA 
Assessment Report, write that “the 
lesson that we should take away 
from” the FHA’s recent history of 
looser underwriting standards is 
that the “FHA, as currently orga-
nized, should not be used as an 
experimental program to encourage 
homeownership.” Robert Van Order 
& Anthony Yezer, FHA Assessment 
Report: The Role of the Federal Hous-
ing Administration in a Recovering 
U.S. Housing Market 9 (George Wash-
ington University Center for Real 
Estate and Urban Analysis June 2011), 
https://creua.business.gwu.edu/
iles/2016/12/2obama-tkomqq.pdf. 
They argue that this is nonetheless 
unavoidable because “there are pow-
erful political forces willing to push 
FHA to allow very unsound lend-
ing practices.” Id. Given that Yezer is 
the co-author of one of the handful of 
comprehensive studies of the FHA, 
this is a damning assessment indeed.
The few policy analysts who have 
made a close study of the FHA agree 
in the main with Yezer and the other 
scholars who have given the FHA 
their sustained attention. The Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute’s Edward 
Pinto, the author of the FHA Watch, 
The FHA’s role 
changed, beginning 
in the 1950s, from 
serving the entire 
mortgage market to 
focusing on speciic 
segments of it.
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writes: “Government insurance pro-
grams suffer from three fundamental 
laws: (1) the government cannot 
successfully price for risk; (2) govern-
ment backing distorts prices, resource 
allocation, and competition; and  
(3) political pressure and congres-
sional demands for a quid pro quo 
inevitably arise, politicizing the pro-
grams.” Edward J. Pinto, Truth in 
Government Lending Is Long Over-
due (Am. Enter. Inst. Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/
truth-in-government-lending-is-long-
overdue/. Housing economist Joseph 
Gyourko is more succinct, but equally 
pessimistic: the FHA “has failed 
by any reasonable metric.” Joseph 
Gyourko, Rethinking the FHA (Am. 




There is much to support these 
characterizations of the FHA, but 
they cherry-pick from the historical 
record to make their cases, focus-
ing on disastrous policies in the early 
1970s and the 2000s. By failing to 
address the FHA’s other initiatives 
over its 80-plus years of operation, 
these commentators fail to make a 
convincing case that the FHA’s his-
tory is a one of failed government 
action. 
Van Order and Yezer’s policy pre-
scription for the FHA is “that over 
time the FHA should revert to its 
previous role: helping irst-time and 
low- to moderate-income homebuy-
ers purchase homes, allowing the 
private sector to shoulder more of the 
risk associated with insuring larger 
loans.” Van Order & Yezer, supra, 
at 2. Van Order and Yezer, like other 
commentators, tend to focus on just 
one aspect of the FHA’s original mis-
sion—providing liquidity to a frozen 
market—and bestow it with an essen-
tial quality: This is what the FHA truly 
is about. The historical record, how-
ever, is much more complicated, 
both at the FHA’s origin and over the 
course of its long history.
Underwriting Sustainable 
Homeownership
The modern FHA states that its 
mission is to serve borrowers that 
the conventional mortgage market 
does not serve effectively: irst-time 
homebuyers as well as “minorities, 
low-income families and residents of 
underserved communities.” U.S. Fed. 
Hous. Admin., Ann. Mgmt. Rep. Fiscal 
Year 2015, at 4. More concretely, right 
after the inancial crisis, it set concrete 
performance goals such as increasing 
homeownership by insuring over 1.4 
million single-family mortgages.
Sadly, it did not seem that the FHA 
learned much from the inancial cri-
sis. By having homeownership goals 
drive its underwriting, it is bound to 
repeat the iscal calamities of the past. 
What is needed—what all commen-
tators agree on—is for appropriate 
underwriting to drive the FHA. This 
is not to say that promoting home-
ownership for various groups is not 
a legitimate goal. It is to say that if it 
is not done in a way that avoids fre-
quent defaults and foreclosures, it can 
do more harm than good to the FHA 
itself and the homeowners it claims 
to serve.
An essential element of appro-
priate underwriting is the down 
payment requirement, as expressed in 
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Indeed, 
there is a strong correlation between 
low LTV and low default rates over 
the FHA’s 80-plus year history. From 
an underwriting perspective, a 20% 
down payment is great. It keeps 
defaults very low. But it is very tough 
for low- and moderate-income fam-
ilies to save enough money in a 
reasonable amount of time to put 
together a 20% down payment. The 
median household income in 2014 
was a bit more than $50,000. The 
median existing home sales price in 
2014 was around $200,000. It would 
take quite some time for that median 
household (let alone a low-income 
household) to save the $40,000 neces-
sary to have a 20% down payment on 
that median house. Moreover, high 
down payment requirements would 
have a disproportionate effect on 
communities of color, which tend to 
have lower income and less wealth 
than white households. There have 
been periodic pushes to decrease 
down payment requirements to 
increase homeownership rates, but 
those pushes have not included an 
evaluation of the sustainability of that 
increase.
To rationalize the FHA’s mission, 
we must ensure that its underwrit-
ing practices make sense. There are 
three generally agreed on goals for 
FHA underwriting: (1) FHA insur-
ance should not require support from 
the public isc; (2) the FHA should 
use lower-risk eligible borrowers 
to cross-subsidize higher-risk eli-
gible borrowers; and (3) the class of 
The modern FHA 
states that its mission 
is to serve borrowers 
that the conventional 
mortgage market does 
not serve efectively: irst-
time homebuyers as well 
as “minorities, low-income 
families and residents of 
underserved communities.”
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eligible borrowers should be limited 
to those with a reasonable likelihood 
of not defaulting on their loans. These 
three goals, taken together, relect 
a view that the FHA’s long-term 
health depends on it navigating long-
standing political debates over the 
“ownership society,” wealth redis-
tribution, and consumer protection 
regulation.
The irst goal, that FHA insurance 
should not require support from the 
public isc, has been part of the FHA’s 
mission since its creation. The capital 
has not received FHA’s recent inan-
cial dificulties with sympathy. It is 
hard, in this environment, to imagine 
a politically feasible alternative to a 
self-supporting FHA.
The second goal, that the FHA 
should use lower-risk eligible bor-
rowers to cross-subsidize higher-risk 
eligible borrowers, has also been inte-
gral to the FHA since its founding. 
Indeed, the FHA’s main program, the 
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, 
was designed to be a form of mutual 
insurance in which policyhold-
ers spread the risk of default among 
themselves. This second goal also has 
been a relatively noncontroversial one.
Surprisingly, the third goal—
ensuring that borrowers do not 
default in high numbers—has been 
given just lip service at various times 
in the FHA’s history. The policy of 
the FHA was sure to err on the side of 
low defaults from the 1930s through 
the 1950s. Starting in the 1960s, how-
ever, this approach was loosened up 
and at times it was implicitly rejected 
or ignored. This was seen with the 
Section 235 iasco of the 1970s, as 
well as the American Dream Down-
payment Act debacle in the 2000s. It 
appears that households and com-
munities of color are most harmed 
by such thoughtlessly loose under-
writing criteria because they are 
disproportionately represented 
among homeowners affected by the 
defaults and foreclosures from those 
failed programs. 
History teaches us that the goal of 
sustainable homeownership should 
not be ignored. It should be hewed 
to closely to ensure the FHA’s viabil-
ity. It also should be hewed to closely 
for the sake of FHA-insured borrow-
ers who should be able to rely on 
FHA underwriting as a signal that 
they will likely be able to afford their 
housing payments and keep their 
homes.
The FHA must work to identify a 
down-payment requirement that bal-
ances access (therefore, no 20% down 
payments) with sustainability (thus, 
no 0% down payments). Academic 
research is beginning to tease out 
how low the FHA’s down payment 
requirement can responsibly go: it 
seems that programs can work in the 
3%–5% range. But we should have 
learned enough from history to know 
we cannot will sustainable homeown-
ership into existence—underwriting 
matters and people must have the 
capacity to maintain their mort-
gages as they deal with the slings and 
arrows of fate, including unemploy-
ment, divorce, and poor health. If the 
FHA does not take these into account, 
too many homeowners will suffer 
from the stresses of default, foreclo-
sure, and eviction.
Conclusion
The FHA has been a versatile tool of 
government since its creation during 
the Great Depression. It was created 
in large part to inject liquidity into a 
moribund mortgage market. It has 
since been repositioned to achieve 
a variety of additional social goals, 
some of which have not been real-
ized. The FHA’s failed programs, 
coupled with the recent inancial 
woes of the FHA that resulted in a 
government bailout, have fueled criti-
cism of the institution. The FHA has 
been more successful, however, in 
achieving its broader goals than is 
generally recognized. Nonetheless, its 
mission still needs clariication and 
its operations likewise need rational-
ization, if it is to assist the low- and 
moderate-income borrowers it claims 
to serve, not just to get a mortgage 
but also to sustain it over the long 
term. n
We should have 
learned enough 
from history to 
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